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Abstract  
When the Thirteen Colonies in North America, the slave colony of Saint-Domingue, and the 
colonial territories of the Portuguese and Spanish Americas all rose against their imperial rulers a 
new postcolonial order seemingly emerged in the Western Hemisphere. The reality of this 
situation forced political theorists and practitioners of the early nineteenth century to rethink the 
way in which they envisioned the nature and dynamics of international order. But a careful 
analysis of this shift reveals that it was not the radical break with prior notions of sovereignty 
and territoriality often described in the literature. This was not the emergence of a new post-
imperial system of independent, nationally anchored states. Rather, it reflected a creative 
rethinking of existing notions of divided sovereignty and composite polities, rife with political 
experiments – from the formation of a new multi-centred empire in North America to the quasi-
states and federations of Latin America. This moment of political experimentation and 
postcolonial order-making presented a distinctly new world repertoire of empire and state-
building, parts of which were at least as violent and authoritarian as those of the old world 
empires it had replaced. The most radical ideas of freedom and liberty, championed by the black 
republic of Haiti, remained marginalized and sidelined by more conservative powers on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
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Introduction 
This article is less about origins than it is about continuity. While the revolutionary decades 
around the turn of the nineteenth century have often been posited as a pivotal moment of 
transformation – the period in which the nation-state either originated or cemented its place in 
international relations and political thought – I argue that it was as much a period of continuity as 
one of radical change. While revolutions swept across the Atlantic and altered the political 
landscape of the Western Hemisphere, these changes did not discard the basic elements of 
existing political order. That is to say, the foundational view of how the political world should be 
organized changed relatively little. In particular, international thought continued to operate to a 
large extent within an older, imperial, repertoire of composite polities and layered sovereignty 
(e.g. Benton, 2010, 30-32; Burbank and Cooper, 2010, 16-17; Stern, 2008). This was a period 
rife with experimentation with the state form to be sure, but such experimentation primarily took 
place within an imperial imagination and only in rare instances did it break out of a hierarchical 
mode of organizing power and institutions that owed much to earlier regimes.  
National states as the organizing units of inter-polity relations were almost entirely 
contained within Europe and even here they solidified and spread only incrementally over the 
course of the nineteenth century. The new polities of the Americas took many different forms, 
from the multicentric republican empire of the United States to the short-lived city-states and 
federations of Spanish South America, but common to all of them was the lingering influence of 
older conceptions of sovereignty, territory, and constitutionalism. Although a break took place 
with the specifics of European colonialism in the new world, political order both between and 
within polities continued to be envisioned within a predominantly imperial register. 
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Of the ruptures that did take place during this period, the most radical had less to do with 
nationhood and anti-imperialism than they had with the specifics of racial hierarchy and notions 
of a very particular freedom – freedom from enslavement. The spread of these notions was more 
limited than the general wave of revolutions, however, and their advocates and thinkers have in 
many cases been less well remembered, side-lined as bit players in the dominating historical 
narratives that cast abolition and emancipation as white reformist projects, rather than black 
revolutionary ones.  
Perhaps paradoxically, historical sociology as a field has been particularly reluctant to 
engage with the central role of empire in the history of the state.1 A number of influential 
sociological accounts have told differing stories about the development of the state, from the 
classic Marxist analysis by Eric Hobsbawm to the explicit critique of historical materialism by 
Anthony Giddens, the majority of which have focused heavily on the early modern and modern 
periods of European history (e.g. Hobsbawm, 1962; Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1993; Ertman, 
1997).2 This focus on European metropoles, combined with a preoccupation with the origins of a 
particular form of “modern” nation-state, often ideal-typically defined along Weberian lines, 
have led historical sociologists to pay disproportionate attention to national, rather than imperial, 
polities.3 Given this tendency, therefore, it is not surprising that the age of revolution and its 
immediate aftermath has overwhelmingly been read by historical sociologists as signifying a 
critical juncture on the path towards nation-states, rather than a more subtle shift within the 
framework of empire (Hobsbawm, 1962, 1-7; Skocpol, 1979, 174-205; Giddens, 1985, 32-34, 
                                                
1 There are some notable recent exceptions to this tendency, in particular the work of Go (2011 and 2013) 
and Adams and Steinmetz (2015). 
2 The obvious geographical exception here is Anderson (2006), discussed in further detail below. It is 
worth noting that Mann has subsequently acknowledged the absence of empire in his earlier work and 
made some attempts at rectifying it (2012, p. vii).  
3 For a general critique of the project of defining “modern” states and state systems, see Cooper (2005, 
113-149). 
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255-257). Pushing back on this particular Eurocentric and nation-centred reading of the age of 
revolution is thus one way of compelling the field to more carefully consider the role of empire 
in the historical processes of state formation, revolution, and inter-polity order. 
 This article contributes to the larger concerns of the special issue by illuminating a 
specific example of the entanglement of practice and theory at a very particular moment of 
transnational history (Barkawi and Lawson, 2016). This moment – the revolutionary decades at 
the turn of the nineteenth century – was fundamentally one of transboundary interaction, not just 
within large imperial polities but also between different empires. While I argue that it was not an 
origins moment per se, it was nonetheless a key period of political experimentation and 
theorizing of the state form, theorizing that came directly out of international or transboundary 
events driven forward by actors who were practitioner-theorists in their own right. Indeed, the 
distinction between practitioners and theorists mattered little to those engaged in the 
revolutionary upheavals at the turn of the century. For these men and women, thinking about the 
state and its place in the world was part of a larger effort of implementing reforms and enacting 
new repertoires of political practice – forging institutions and reshaping legal and political 
frameworks in the process.  
 
Reading practice as theory 
This article does not follow the traditional approach of viewing the history of political ideas 
through the optic of great canonical thinkers and their body of work. Rather, it adopts an 
approach that insists not only on the entanglement of theory and practice but on the necessity of 
reading practitioners as theorists, fashioning their own view of the dynamics of the world around 
them through their actions and policies. 
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Two related trends in intellectual and legal history have paved the way for this particular 
approach. The first is the time-honoured historical method of focusing on the practical and 
political context within which influential works of theory have been written (e.g. Van Ittersum, 
2006; Hunter, 2013). The other trend is of a more recent date. A number of scholars have begun 
to focus on political and legal practitioners as theorists in their own right, highlighting the way in 
which judges, politicians, and magistrates argued for their particular interpretations of imperial 
law (e.g. Pitts, 2010; Fitzmaurice, 2014). A slew of recent works on the history of empire have 
combined these two approaches, effectively writing the history of imperial practices and the 
history of imperial theoretical and legal justifications as one and the same (Mantena, 2010; 
Benton and Straumann, 2010; Benton and Ford, forthcoming).  
The approach advocated here goes beyond a search for the historical origins of particular 
theories or an insistence on the importance of historical context (e.g. Pocock, 1957; Skinner, 
1969). Instead, it argues that practices themselves constitute a certain type of theorizing. It is no 
coincidence that such an approach has been particularly fruitful in legal history, since legal 
documents and rulings contain within them justifications and analyses which have the potential 
to make broader claims about the political or social world based on the details of specific cases. 
But the insights are not limited to legal history – indeed, much political practice can be read as 
theory when looked at from a certain vantage point. Does a head of government or a 
revolutionary leader have to write down a doctrine for us to be able to say that their policies 
constitute a particular view of the world? Surely a careful reading of their actions and policies 
can provide some insight into their perspective on the political landscape that surrounds them.4  
                                                
4 In some cases such actors did indeed document their thoughts in a more coherent and systematic fashion, 
but given the vagaries of historical scholarship and the passage of time these texts have not always been 
submitted to careful scholarly analysis. See for example the rich sources left behind by Toussaint 
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Constitutions and declarations of independence are arguably among the most potent 
examples of specific political theories articulated within practice-oriented frameworks, whether 
authored by individuals or by committees (e.g. Lane, 1996; Armitage, 2008). Such texts 
represent the way in which the elites of new polities conceive of themselves, including crucially 
their relationship to other states and their position in inter-state politics. They are not just 
documents meant for governance or targeted at internal audiences, but also messages being 
broadcast to the other powers of the world, signalling goals, ambitions, and attitudes. In one 
sense, then, declarations of independence and founding constitutions are the products of very 
specific marriages between pragmatic politics and aspirational ideological frameworks, 
encapsulated into documents with lasting historical consequences. When studied on their own 
terms, they can be revealing windows into these moments of political turmoil, potentially 
illuminating the weltanschauung of their composers.  
 
A revolutionary moment 
Since R. R. Palmer’s influential work in the 1950s, historians of Western Europe and the Atlantic 
world more broadly have referred to the decades surrounding the nineteenth century as the age of 
revolution (Palmer, 1959 and 1964).5 This particular moment has been seen historiographically 
as a defining turning point in the emergence of not only nationalism but also the “nation-form” – 
the progenitor of the twenty-first century nation-state model – whether this emergence has been 
located on one side of the Atlantic (Bell, 2001; Sewell Jr., 2004) or the other (Brading, 1993; 
Anderson, 2006). Indeed, much of the historiographical debate of the past two decades has 
                                                                                                                                                       
Louverture, including his short memoir explicitly defending his political programme as governor of Saint-
Domingue (Girard, 2013 and 2014). 
5 Palmer’s original work was notably Eurocentric, relegating the revolutions in Latin America to a few 
sentences and leaving the Haitian Revolution entirely untouched. 
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centred on the origin points of this new mode of politics, the central question being whether the 
old imperial metropoles or the colonies of the new world were the more important spaces for 
turning revolutionary ideals into political transformations. To put it somewhat crudely, this was a 
debate between Paris and Port-au-Prince (e.g. Dubois, 2004; Geggus, 2010). 
Of notable importance for this debate has been Benedict Anderson’s magisterial account 
of nationalism and, in particular, his notion of a certain kind of revolutionary creole nationalism 
originating in the colonial Americas (Anderson, 2006, 49-67). The creole elites of Anderson’s 
story pioneered the idea of modern nationalism in the decades leading up to their revolutionary 
struggles against European imperial metropoles, and the formation of autonomous postcolonial 
republics in South America was essentially the culmination of this process. This creole 
nationalism, Anderson argues, contained a particularly modular notion of what exactly a nation 
meant, making it all the more easy for the intellectual framework to circulate and take root across 
the globe during the following century (Anderson, 2006, 80-82).  
A number of European historians have pushed back against Anderson’s account, arguing 
that the revisionist views of the origins of nationalism have gone too far in decentring European 
politics from the intellectual origins of a modular nation-form. Such critiques include arguments 
focusing on the importance of the French Revolution for articulations of the nation as a political 
project (Sewell Jr., 2004) as well as arguments for locating the origins of nationalism far earlier, 
in seventeenth century Northwestern Europe (Pincus, 1999; Gorski, 2000). In recent years the 
field seems to have moved towards a more complex and multifaceted understanding of the period, 
focusing more on the circulation of revolutionary ideas and practices across the ocean than on 
the somewhat one-sided search for specific points of origin (e.g. Klooster, 2009). 
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The various historical narratives of the age of revolutions, whether they place their 
emphasis on one side of the Atlantic or the other, have been immensely important for our 
conceptions of the development of the international system. As indicated above, the period has 
typically been read in both historical sociology and international relations as heralding the 
beginnings of a global shift away from pre-modern polity types and towards the modern nation-
state.6 However, when looking more carefully at the revolutionary upheavals at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, and especially at the political reforms and reorientations of their immediate 
aftermath, it becomes clear that this is less the story of a groundbreaking shift in perceptions and 
more one of continuity and experimentation within existing modes of political ordering. While 
European political thinkers gradually began to operate with the nation-form as a central unit of 
analysis, political thought and practice outside the narrow confines of Western Europe looked 
quite different. What revolutionaries and republicans in the Caribbean and the Americas 
championed was not a new political entity easily recognizable as the nation-state of the twentieth 
or twenty-first century. Autonomy did not mean nationhood and revolution did not spell the end 
of empire. 
 
Constitutional thought and political experiments 
The major revolutionary powers of the Western Hemisphere – the United States, Haiti, Gran 
Colombia, the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, and Brazil – all followed distinct paths to 
independence and adopted quite disparate strategies once autonomy had been achieved. The US 
endeavoured to build a new empire to rival those of the European powers, with multiple different 
                                                
6 E.g. Hobsbawm (1962), Giddens (1985), Mayall (1990), Mann (1993), Reus-Smit (2013). In their 
account of the political transformations of the nineteenth century, Buzan and Lawson avoid making a 
similar claim by limiting most of their discussion of the nation-form in the international system to the last 
decades of the century (2015, 35, 117-118). 
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centres and interests in partial competition with each other; the Spanish American states 
struggled to forge new alliances, both with each other and with foreign imperial actors, 
simultaneously resisting and welcoming outside influences, while experimenting with federation 
and autonomy in the process; Brazil attempted to replace Lisbon as the centre of the Lusophone 
colonial world; and Haiti created an autonomous space not driven by ambitions of nationhood or 
expansion, but rather by notions of racial equality and abolition, whether within the French 
Empire or outside of it. Despite these differences, they all shared a number of common features 
in their approach to fashioning a stable political order. 
The historiography on US empire has been far more developed than any of the other 
cases here examined, in part because of the very visibility of imperial ambitions in American 
politics during the early republican period. Indeed, notions of empire were built in to the US 
Constitution itself, positioning the young republic as a political contender among the powers of 
the earth while retaining important continuities with the legal and political framework of the 
British Empire in North America (Lawson and Seidman, 2003; Hulsebosch, 2005, 203-258). In 
one influential reading of this founding document, the Constitution is seen as a “peace pact” 
between the disparate polities that made up the United States, ensuring that they would unite as a 
single empire, rather than wage war against one another over the territory and resources of North 
America (Hendrickson, 2003). This imperial ambition was carried forward into the 
administration of the third US president, Thomas Jefferson, who put both expansion and 
intervention at the heart of his foreign policy with the Louisiana Purchase, the Barbary War, the 
“civilizing program” of assimilating Native Americans into the empire, and continued westward 
expansion being prime examples (McCoy, 1980; Hendrickson and Tucker, 1990; Golay, 2003).  
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The Monroe Doctrine, a set of policy propositions authored by American President James 
Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in 1823, became a turning point of sorts for 
the nineteenth century political division of the Atlantic world into a western and an eastern half. 
This document made it clear that the Western Hemisphere was first and foremost a space of new 
world empires, and would from now on be outside the reach of old world colonialism:  
 
… with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, 
and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, 
acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing 
them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in 
any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the 
United States.7 
 
The doctrine would, of course, later become a rationale the for the United States’ own 
interventions in Latin America, but even in its original form it was arguably more about 
demarcating spheres of influence than about rejecting the notion of imperialism (Murphy, 2009). 
The US was an interesting example of a multicentric imperial polity. Given its origins as 
thirteen distinct colonies and the reading of the constitution as a peace pact given above, it 
should come as no surprise that there were different centres of political power in the early 
republic. At the turn of the century, three cities in particular competed over the informal seat of 
imperial power – New York, Philadelphia, and Washington – the country’s newly erected capitol. 
Each of these cities presented their own ambitious imperial projects, focusing in particular on 
major infrastructure and legislation meant to project American power across the continent 
(Kanhofer, forthcoming). Later, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the internal 
competition for empire shifted to the north-south divide that would become so critical for the 
future of the union. 
                                                
7 Message of President James Monroe at the commencement of the first session of the 18th Congress, 2 
December 1823, Records of the United States Senate 1789-1990, the National Archives. 
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Imperial expansion was of particular importance to the southern states, as this provided 
an opportunity to spread the institution of slavery to new parts of the growing American empire, 
especially important given the rising power of northern abolitionist movements. The most 
obvious targets for colonial enterprises of this sort were the plantation islands of the Caribbean, 
but southern elites also had their eyes on expansion into Central and Western America and the 
remnants of New Spain (May, 1989). This coalesced with the general American trend of 
westward expansion, culminating in the late 1830s and 1840s with the notion of manifest destiny, 
a particularly American form of settler colonialism that came to dominate much of the country’s 
political discourse (Graebner, 1955; Haynes and Morris, 1997; Rifkin, 2009).  
While the different political centres of the US had competing visions of what an 
American empire ought to look like, these ambitions often came together to shape what was in 
general an outward-looking policy of intervention and expansion. In this way the US proved to 
be both a competitor with and an inheritor of the British Empire to which its founding colonies 
had belonged. The obsession with empire building continued within influential strands of US 
policy throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, with practitioner-theorists at 
various times looking eastward to the Caribbean, south towards Central America, and westward 
to the Pacific Ocean (Heffer, 1995; Hendrickson, 2009; Magness and Page, 2011). 8 
The revolutions in the Spanish Americas were not initially about rejecting empire as 
much as about contesting the centres of legitimacy and authority within the empire itself. The 
initial impetus for the revolutions was the fall of the House of Bourbon during the Napoleonic 
Wars and the establishment of the Supreme Central Junta of Seville in 1809, which claimed to 
                                                
8 A different but parallel strand of US imperialism was carried out by relatively autonomous agents on the 
ground, stretching from Panama to Canton, with little direct involvement by political authorities (e.g. 
Warren, 1943; Brown, 1980; Downs, 1997; Blaufarb, 2007; McGuinness, 2009). For the long trajectory 
of US interventionism abroad, see Williams (1980). 
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rule all of the Spanish Empire overseas. Several competing juntas were established across the 
colonies, growing rapidly following the defeat of the Central Junta by Napoleon’s forces in 1810, 
and a decade of conflict between the various juntas and between the juntas and the Spanish 
Empire took place over the next decade. The early state projects of Latin America were wrought 
by internal tensions between loyalists and republicans – those who saw a the old European 
metropoles as disseminators of political legitimacy and those who would replace those symbols 
with a new world republican federalism, itself evolved from an older imperial political 
imagination (Adelman, 2006).  
These conflicts brought together a diverse cast of political actors, including influential 
creole revolutionaries such as Simón Bolívar, born in Caracas, and José Gervasio Artigas, born 
in Montevideo, as well as many royalists who continued to see themselves as imperial subjects 
first and foremost and who, while ready to reject a Napoleonic puppet regime, were less eager to 
embrace complete independence from the empire. Such men came to the ascendance during the 
brief but bloody Reconquista – the Spanish Empire’s attempt to regain control of its American 
colonies following the restoration of Ferdinand VII in 1814. As defeating the returning Spanish 
forces, the majority of who were American royalists rather than Europeans, became the key aim 
for republicans, revolutionary regimes moved towards consolidating their power and forging new 
continental alliances amidst these internal conflicts. This consolidation led to more organized 
experiments aimed at replacing the formal imperial authority of Spain with new unitary 
cosmopolitan federations, gathering together provincial juntas and city-states who shared similar 
visions of autonomy and self-control. 
In attempting to consolidate power and establish a sustainable post-revolutionary political 
order in the former Spanish territories, men such as Bolívar and Artigas acted as practitioner-
 13 
theorists in their own right. While they did not leave behind large bodies of tracts and 
monographs, as some of their predecessors and contemporaries in North America had done, they 
nonetheless formulated clear theories of statecraft and governance, visible in declarations and 
speeches such as Artigas’ Instrucciones del año XIII or Bolívar’s Angostura Address (Street, 
1959; Bushnell, 2003).  
Perhaps the clearest and most famous example of such texts was Bolívar’s so-called 
Jamaican Letter, a letter written in 1815 to one Henry Cullen of Jamaica. In it, Bolívar not only 
analysed the recent history of the Latin American struggles for independence, including the 
failure of the Second Republic of Venezuela the previous year, but framed these conflicts within 
a wider context of trans-imperial upheaval across the Western Hemisphere, aligning the fates of 
Caribbean, South American, and North American subjects. The letter also highlighted the 
unequal and unfair differentiation of subject groups by the Spanish Empire, while making it clear 
that this colonial legacy would continue to play a central role in the new Latin American polities:  
 
… we, who preserve only the barest vestige of what we were formerly, and who 
are moreover neither Indians nor Europeans, but a race halfway between the 
legitimate owners of the land and the Spanish usurpers – in short, being 
Americans by birth and endowed with rights from Europe – find ourselves forced 
to defend these rights against the natives while maintaining our position in the 
land against intrusion of the invaders.9 
 
There was thus little space for the rights of indigenous populations in Bolívar’s America. Indeed, 
the ideology shaping these new state projects was not so much a universal liberalism as it was a 
certain kind of constitutionalism, one that drew directly on and contributed to the growing body 
of federalist and confederalist thought coming out of the American Revolution. 
                                                
9  “The Jamaican Letter: Response from a South American to a Gentleman from This Island,” printed and 
translated in Bushnell (2003, 18). The letter is of further interest because it had as its secondary subject 
the government of the British Empire, serving as a call for recognition and support of the new Spanish 
American polities. 
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One of the key components of this federalism was also an important characteristic of 
earlier imperial rule – the notion of divisible and layered sovereignty. The principle of layered 
sovereignty was built into the constitutions of both Gran Colombia, the republican successor to 
the Spanish colony of New Grenada, and the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, which 
replaced the colonial Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata following the May Revolution of 1810. 
Cities and provinces such as Buenos Aires and Santa Fe in the Río de la Plata and Bogotá and 
Quito in Gran Colombia were autonomous or semi-autonomous political units in their own right, 
enjoying a degree of sovereign control layered below the overarching sovereignty of the political 
federations to which they belonged.10 While the political experiments of the new world ran from 
relatively revolutionary republicanism to monarchical neo-authoritarianism, all of these state-
building projects thus involved ideas of multi-layered sovereignty and were founded on remnants 
of the imperial administrative order of the ancien regime (Rodríguez, 1998; Chiaramonte, 2004). 
In the words of Benton and Ford, these were “Republican visions built on structures of colonial 
and imperial bureaucracy, including and especially law” (forthcoming).   
As new republics emerged out of the ruins of the first Latin American federations in the 
1830s, the involvement of old European empires on the continent also became more formalized. 
While the initial involvement of especially the British Empire in the Americas had been a matter 
of strong dispute within creole elites, with arguments ranging from ambivalent rejection by 
Artigas to the very direct embrace of imperial interventions by Carlos Alvear (Benton and Ford, 
forthcoming), the 1830s saw a more unambiguous invitation of European commercial power into 
the Western Hemisphere. While European policy-makers did their best to use this opening to 
                                                
10 Such relationships were not always without tension, of course, and led to multiple internal conflicts in 
the 1810s and ‘20s, resulting ultimately in the demise of these large federations. For the long-term 
rivalries of regional hubs such as Montevideo and Buenos Aires that carried over into the republican 
period, see Prado (2015). 
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influence Latin American political processes in what has often been termed a strategy of 
“informal empire” (Gallagher and Robinson, 1953), such diplomatic manoeuvrings were rarely 
very successful and the American republics generally managed to retain a great deal of 
independence while gradually becoming more integrated into emerging global markets (Mclean, 
1995, 39-65).  
Parallel to and at times entangled with the struggles over autonomy in Spanish South 
America was the internal strife that shook the Portuguese Empire in the 1810s and ‘20s. During 
Napoleon’s occupation of Portugal, the seat of the Portuguese monarchy relocated to Brazil. As 
Portugal regained its independence following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, a schism broke out 
between those in the royal family who returned to Europe and those who remained in Brazil, 
namely the Prince Regent Dom Pedro (Adelman, 2006, 220-257, 340-342). This schism was in 
part a struggle between the older generation, favouring a continuation of absolute monarchy, and 
the younger supporters of constitutionalism, eventually leading to the revolution of 1820 and to 
the establishment of the Empire of Brazil by Dom Pedro, now Pedro I, in 1822.  
The Braganza monarchy in Brazil became independent of the Portuguese branch of the 
royal dynasty, ruling over its own version of a federal empire in the Americas and rivalling 
Lisbon as a seat of power and authority in the wider Lusophone world (Hamnet, 2013). The 
Brazilian Empire was thus, despite its embrace of constitutional rather than absolute monarchy, a 
new world inheritor to one of Europe’s longest-lived anciens regimes and no less imperial than 
its older Portuguese progenitor (Paquette, 2013). Crucially, it continued to operate within an 
imperial register of rule, relying on differentiation of subject groups and a hierarchical political 
order internally and expansionism and colonialism externally. 
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The revolution in Saint-Domingue was not initially an attempt to forge a new polity 
independent of the French Empire. Rather, it was an attack upon the social order of the colony, 
founded as it was on systemic racial violence, the exploitation of black slaves, and the partial 
disenfranchisement of the island’s free people of colour. This was a multifaceted revolution with 
different groupings and different aims, which were not always entirely overlapping. After a 
tumultuous decade of fighting and infighting, which included interventions or attempted 
interventions by both Spanish and the British empires, the revolutionary leader and former slave 
Toussaint Louverture took control of the island colony at the turn of the century. 
Louverture’s initial constitution was in some ways a radical document, but it did not 
break with the fundamental institution of empire. It was drafted by the constitutional assembly of 
Hispaniola, mostly consisting of white planters, and was approved by Louverture in July of 1801. 
This was not in any way a call for national sovereignty, but specifically a constitution for “the 
French colony of Saint-Domingue,” which together with “other adjacent islands constitute the 
territory of a single colony that forms part of the French empire, but which is subject to particular 
laws.” A colony with a certain level of legal and political autonomy, in other words, but a colony 
nonetheless, to be administered by “a governor, who will correspond directly with the 
metropolitan government regarding everything concerning the interest of the colony.” In one 
important area this was, however, a radical document: the third article stated, with no caveats or 
exceptions, that “there can exist no slaves in this territory; servitude therein is forever 
abolished.”11   
                                                
11 Constitution de la colonie française de Saint-Domingue, Paris, 1801. This print is held at the Rare Book 
Division, New York Public Library. Even emancipation in Haiti was a long-term process with important 
antecedents in the period of French colonial rule, and the debates over slavery and liberation in the 1790s 
and 1800s frequently referred to the older Code Noir, underscoring the continued relevance of imperial 
legal frameworks (Ghachem, 2012). 
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After a brief period of restoration of French imperial authority in Saint-Domingue, 
enforced by Napoleon’s forces and resulting in the deportation and death of Louverture, Jean-
Jacques Dessalines declared Haitian independence on the first of January 1804. In contrast to the 
relatively conservative constitution of the Louverture government, Dessaline’s constitution of 
May 1805 definitively severed Haiti’s ties to the French Empire, declaring in Article 12 that “no 
white man of whatever nation he may be, shall put his foot on this territory with the title of 
master or proprietor, neither shall he in future acquire any property therein.”12 Perhaps more 
interesting for the issue of imperialism in general, as opposed to the specifics of European 
powers, was the Haitian commitment not to engage in any expansionist or interventionist policies. 
Article 36 of the Dessaline constitution thus read: “The Emperor shall never form any enterprize 
with the views of making conquests, nor to disturb the peace and interior administration of 
foreign colonies.” While Haiti was to be the first black empire of the Western Hemisphere, it was 
deliberately designed by its founders to be a non-expansionist and non-interventionist power, in 
part to reassure the other powers of the Atlantic world. 
These self-imposed restraints on expansionist policies were eventually abandoned, with 
then-President Jean-Pierre Boyer’s invasion of the Eastern half of Hispaniola in 1822 signalling 
a new and more aggressive role in the region. The Spanish colony of Santo Domingo had gone 
through its own revolution the previous year, with the revolutionary junta of what was now 
known as the Republic of Spanish Haiti (later the Dominican Republic) attempting to join forces 
with Gran Colombia and the government of Simón Bolívar. This union never materialized, 
however, and following a bloodless military invasion all of the island of Hispaniola came under 
                                                
12 This translation is taken from the New York Evening Post, 15 July 1805. Dessalines’ declaration of 28 
April 1804, which was in many ways a predecessor to the constitution proper, put it in even clearer terms 
vis-à-vis empire: “Never shall any colonist or European set foot on this land as a master or a proprietor.” 
(Jean-Jacques Dessalines to the Inhabitants of Haiti, in the National Archives of Britain, Colonial Office 
137/113). For more on the constitution in general, see Gaffield (2007, 81-103). 
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the rule of Boyer for the next two decades. Not surprisingly, given Haiti’s own history, one of 
the first acts by Boyer’s government was the total and unconditional emancipation of the slaves 
of Santo Domingo.13 While this period of Haitian rule was closer to territorial expansion than 
colonial occupation, it did result in decidedly hierarchical political relations between the two 
constituent polities, with considerable internal pressure for independence brewing among 
Dominican elites.14 
Haitian independence had important reverberations, both in the Western Hemisphere and 
in Europe. Haiti’s influence on the ideas of certain European political philosophers, in particular 
Hegel, has been well documented (e.g. Buck-Morss, 2009), but the more practical political 
consequences of Haitian independence have only recently been scrutinized by historians. One of 
the first comprehensive accounts of the Haitian Revolution to appear in Europe was Michael 
Rainsford’s An historical account of the Black Empire of Hayti, which painted Louverture as an 
idealistic revolutionary and a benevolent emperor. As the title of his book implies, Rainsford 
described Haiti not as a nation or a colony but as a black Atlantic empire (Rainsford, 1805). This 
sympathetic narrative represented one end of the spectrum of European reactions, with the 
majority of commentators and onlookers being far more hostile toward the very notion of an 
empire forged by slaves. European imperial elites were particularly worried, as the prospects of 
further slave uprisings in the wake of 1801 loomed large (Mulich, 2013). Such fears led to some 
Caribbean colonies moving in the opposite direction, imposing tightened control over their 
populations and moving towards ever more draconian and hierarchical rule (Ferrer, 2014).  
                                                
13 This had previously been done in 1801 when Louverture took control of the territory, but was quickly 
reversed by the Spanish Empire. 
14 The clearest example of these sentiments was the formation of La Trinitaria, a Dominican secret society 
with the aim of overthrowing Haitian rule over eastern Hispaniola. It is worth noting that once this goal 
had been accomplished in 1844, the new ruler of the Dominican Republic, Don Pedro Santana, almost 
immediately betrayed La Trinitaria and invited the Spanish Empire to return to the island, in effect 
recolonizing Santo Domingo (Matibag, 2003). 
 19 
The Haitian governments of the first decade and a half of independence were themselves 
important in spreading notions of black liberty and emancipation throughout the region, in part 
through their dealings with other revolutionary leaders. Indeed, rulers such as Alexandre Pétion 
demanded from their allies, namely Bolívar, that they emancipate the slaves of their own 
territories as well as those enslaved Africans they captured through privateering (Ferrer, 2012). 
In this and other ways, the ideals of Haiti were not just important influences on Atlantic and 
Caribbean political thought, but were advanced concretely and strategically by Haitian elites in 
their dealings with foreign powers (see also Smith, 2014; Gaffield, 2015). 
Haitian relations with the French Empire shifted over the course of the post-independence 
period. Initially refusing to accept Haitian independence at all, the French government eventually 
agreed to recognize the former colony as a sovereign republic only if it would pay France 150 
million francs as compensation for the loss of men and territory incurred by the revolution. 
Importantly, this claim for compensation was based in part on the claims made by individual 
plantation owners who demanded recompense for land and slaves lost to the revolution.15 Haiti 
also landed in trouble with the Spanish Empire, as the government granted asylum to Bolívar and 
assisted him with resources during his fight against the Spanish Empire. Yet despite all these 
struggles with the old European empires, and despite the betrayed promises of political liberty 
within the territory of Haiti itself, the very idea of the Haitian state remained a beacon of hope in 
the black Atlantic. In the 1840s a commentator in the Jamaica Tribune, witnessing Spain’s 
recolonization of Santo Domingo, put it thusly: “Where, we ask, is France? Or England, the 
champion of universal freedom? … Haiti is without a doubt the only place on earth that can truly 
be called the homeland of the African race.” (Quoted in Smith, 2014, 109). 
                                                
15 These claims mirrored similar ones made by British slave owners during the 1830s when the British 
Empire abolished slavery within its colonies. In the British case such demands were met, with 
compensations totaling twenty million pounds sterling. 
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The continuity of empire 
Throughout the age of revolution, empire continued to be the dominant mode of ordering the 
political sphere, both within and between polities. The political imagination and theoretical 
framework of many policy-makers and intellectuals in the Western Hemisphere continued to be 
characterized at least in part by imperial structures well into the nineteenth century, even within 
the most ardently independent polities of the Americas. What took place at the dawn of the 
nineteenth century, then, was not a shift away from imperial states and towards nation-states, but 
instead a messy process of replacing the repertoires of ancien régime empires with those of the 
newly autonomous polities of the new world, many of which were expansionist empires in their 
own right. What drove these breaks with the old order was not a newfound desire for nationhood 
in any of the cases here examined – rather, the breaks were driven by a complex set of causes 
and pressures that came together to spark social and political revolutions. These factors included 
the desire for increased political representation and a reconfiguration of colonial ties in North 
America; a demand for a more just racial order in Saint-Domingue; and clashes over the sources 
of sovereignty in the Spanish and Portuguese Americas. In the messy aftermath of such 
upheavals, new modes of organizing were forged and many old ones were retained. 
 The four cases examined in the previous section displayed different degrees of parting 
with the old order, from the staunchly conservative Brazilian Empire to the more radical Haitian 
governments, but all of them shared aspects of the political modality of empire. In terms of racial 
parity, Haiti was no doubt the most revolutionary, followed by the republics of the Spanish 
Americas, at least in their first years of independence. In terms of democratic constitutionalism 
and narrowly dispersed civil rights, the United States was arguably the most innovative, drawing 
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on both new and old world political philosophy. Even when clear breaks were made with 
imperial and colonial forms of government, the first half of the nineteenth century saw several 
polities undo such ruptures. The clearest and most startling example to contemporaries was the 
Spanish recolonization of Haiti’s eastern neighbour, Santo Domingo, but a more widespread 
trend was the reneging on earlier promises of emancipation across much of Latin America and 
the Caribbean. While the Law of Wombs was passed in the United Provinces of the Río de la 
Plata in 1813, promising that no one could be born into bondage, general slavery was not ended 
in the region until it was written into the Argentine Constitution of 1853, a full four decades later. 
Similar protracted processes of abolition and emancipation took place in Gran Colombia, 
Venezuela, and Mexico. Brazil, for its part, remained one of the last bastions of slavery, refusing 
to enact full emancipation until the adoption of the so-called Golden Law in 1888. 
At the centre of the forging of new states in the western hemisphere stood a particular 
breed of revolutionary practitioner-theorists. Through their actions, policies, and writings these 
leaders drew on and contributed to new notions of republicanism, constitutionalism, and 
federalism. The circuits through which such ideas travelled were inherently transboundary, 
facilitating dialogues that not only crossed the divide between North and South America but also 
crossed the Atlantic, shaping political and intellectual landscapes on both sides of the ocean. The 
experiments of leaders such as Artígas, Bolívar, and Louverture were born out of necessity, 
forged in the fires of transboundary conflict and crisis, but they were also influenced by novel 
ideas of how to organize polities and how to govern colonial and postcolonial societies. This 
marriage of pragmatism and ideology in many ways formed the foundation of new world state-
building. 
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 At the constitutional level, political experimentation did not preclude the continuation of 
empire. The new polities of Spanish South America were republics to be sure. But as the United 
States had already shown in recent memory, and the Dutch and Roman empires had proven 
decades and centuries before, there was no inherent dichotomy between republicanism and 
imperialism. More radical, perhaps, were the experiments with city-states and continental 
federations, which dominated Latin American politics in the first two decades after independence, 
especially on the eastern coast, but even these creative endeavours carried with them particular 
notions of composite polities and layered sovereignty inherent in imperial modes of ordering 
politics. 
 Other experiments within the new Atlantic polities were of a fundamentally conservative 
or authoritarian nature, concerned with enacting social control rather than with bestowing new 
political liberties. These new imperial repertoires included first and foremost a reaffirmation and 
partial rearticulation of the hierarchical racial order. Slavery persisted for considerably longer in 
the new world empires than in most of the old European empires, not because of a newfound 
benevolence on the part of slave owners or any less desire to throw off their shackles on the part 
of slaves, but in no small part due to innovative new systems of control and violence.16   
A prominent example of such regimes was to be found in the US, where a series of slave 
uprisings and the spectre of the Haitian Revolution led to an increased obsession with race and a 
large-scale expansion and reinforcement of the institution of slavery itself (White, 2010; Johnson, 
2013; Baptist, 2014). Legal reforms restricting the mobility and political agency of black 
subjects, and outlawing miscegenation, grew over the course of the nineteenth century, 
especially in the Southern states, eventually resulting in the one-drop rule, which legally defined 
                                                
16 Other crucial factors leading to the divergence of slave regimes in European and American empires in 
the early nineteenth century were related to the politics of abolitionist activism and the strength of public 
moral and religious movements in Europe (Brown, 2006). 
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anyone with even a single ancestor of African descent as “black.”  Thus the Florida Assembly 
passed an act in 1865 that legally defined “every person who shall have one-eight or more of 
negro blood” as a “person of color.”17 
Other polities in the Western Hemisphere not directly touched by revolutionary 
upheavals went through similar authoritarian reforms, often increasing or extending the reach of 
their state apparatus to stave off the potential for political instability. Cuba was an obvious 
example of this process, witnessing its own “counterrevolution of slavery and racism” during the 
last part of the Haitian Revolution, providing the colonial “antithesis” to that new black empire 
(Ferrer, 2014, 187, 338). Similar examples of racial prejudice infusing political and legal regimes 
could be found throughout the Spanish Caribbean, including Puerto Rico (Kinsbruner, 1996). 
Given these circumstances, it should come as no surprise that Haiti was the polity of the 
ones here examined that struggled the most with gaining interstate recognition following its 
successful bid for independence. It represented an explicit dismissal of white supremacy and 
became a beacon of black empowerment within a political region that was explicitly built on 
racial hierarchies and violence enacted upon black bodies.18 Haitian leaders continued to speak 
words of liberty into a political vacuum that refused to listen. While empire and sovereignty were 
malleable and flexible categories with room for experimentation and interpretation, the racial 
dimensions of social ordering in the Atlantic world proved much harder to disrupt. The window 
of emancipation that had opened up in the years surrounding the turn of the century soon closed, 
                                                
17 “An act in addition to an act entitled an act to amend the act entitled an act concerning marriage 
licenses approved January 23, 1823,” passed during the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly of 
the State of Florida, 1865.  
18 In the eyes of white practitioner-theorists in the nineteenth century, the notion of a Black Atlantic did 
not stretch any further than the coastal waters of West Africa. See in particular the work of Trouillot on 
the unthinkable nature of Haitian independence to European writers and philosophers (1995, 70-107). On 
the notion of the Black Atlantic in general, see also Gilroy (1993), Thornton (1998), and, more recently, 
Diouf and Prais (2015). 
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and, as mentioned above, the majority of newly independent polities either reversed or limited 
their initial moves towards full emancipation, leading to a much longer and more protracted 
process of black liberation than had initially seemed likely. It would take another three decades 
after Haitian independence before the slaves of the British Empire were emancipated, in an act 
that was ultimately framed as one of white benevolence rather than black empowerment.19   
While this might have been a postcolonial moment for many states in the Western 
Hemisphere, it was far from a post-imperial one. Unlike the classic narratives of the age of 
revolution that cast the early decades of the nineteenth century as a new dawn for the 
international system, this article has argued that the period was in fact characterized as much by 
continuity as by transformation. What changes did take place in the interstate system had more to 
do with the specifics of border drawings and centres of power than they did with revolutionizing 
the state-form itself, and much of the experimentation that took place never fully broke free from 
the framework of imperial ordering. Only in a few cases did imperial modes of rule collapse 
entirely, and only after prolonged struggles to return to the status quo. And these cases had, 
despite their historical significance, relatively little impact on the way in which ruling elites and 
practitioner-theorists envisioned their political world. As such, the most radical theories of racial 
equity and black empowerment that emerged out of the wreckage of the age of revolutions were 
largely ignored and their advocates were, for the most part, speaking into the wind.  
  
                                                
19 Of course there was a significant disconnect between the way such things were talked about among 
imperial practitioners and theorists and the way it looked from the ground in many colonial territories. 
The way in which the slaves of the Danish West Indies were freed – by a desperate act of concession by 
the local governor-general in the face of a forceful black uprising, later retold as a carefully deliberated 
and compassionate political decision – is but one example (Hall, 1992, 208-227). 
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